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1. Resp was convicted after a trial in the USDC 
~ ~ 'PtO~nl~ 
of ~~u.~o~ 




registered still, carrying on the business of a distiller 
without giving bond and with intent to defraud the government 
of whiskey tax, possession of 175 gallons of whiskey upon 
which no taxes had been paid, and conspiracy to defraud the 
United States of tax revenues, violations of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371 and 26 U.S.C. § 5601. He was given concurrent prison 
- 2 -
terms of three years. CA 5 reversed on the ground that 
resp's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the admission 
of evidence obtained by defective subpoenas directed to two -
banks. 
latter by a impson, Brown, Bell, Ainsworth, Dyer, 
Roney, Gee, The SG petitions for cert contending 
that resp did not have standing to raise Fourth Amendment ob-
jections to the subpoenas, that the subpoenas were not defective 
and violative of the Fourth Amendment, and that, if there was such 
a violation, there was no prejudice to resp requiring reversal of 
his conviction. 
2. FACTS: Agents of the Federal Alcohol, Tobacco & 
Firearms Unit presented to the presidents of two banks in Georgia 
grand jury subpoenas duces tecum requiring that they appear in 
'=- ,....______........._...... t:wz~ 
the USDC at 9:00 a.m. on January 24, 1973, and that they produce 
"a.JJ: records of accounts, i.~., savings, checking, loan or 
_... ...... --- .,.......__ 
otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller, 3859 Mathis Street, 
Macon, Ga. and/or Mitch Miller, Associates, 100 Executive Ter-
race, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 1972, through the 
present date." Resp was not given notice of these subpoenas. 
When the banks supplied the requested materials to the 
agents, the presidents were told that they would not have to 
appear at the District Court for the January 24 and grand jury 
session. The grand jury did not meet until February 12, 1973. 
~~-~---------~------------------~ The agents had reviewed the bank records and made copies of 
some which were introduced by the prosecution at trial. They 
('1 0 
- 3 -
!were used to help establish at least three of the overt acts cha r ged against res p in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The presidents of the banks indicated that the microfilm 
copies of the records which were shown to the agents were 
\ 
kept in compliance with the Treasury and Banking regulations 
issued un~r t~e Bank Secrecy_ Act. The DC denied resp's 
motion to suppress the copies of the records. 
CA 5 reversed. It noted that this Court in upholding 
the Bank Secrecy Act in California Bankers Association v. 
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), had observed that depositors had 
adequa te protection from improper governmental access to the 
records which the banks were required to keep because " access . 
to the records is to be controlled by existing legal process. " 
Id., at 52. In this case, the government had not complied with 
that legal process: " Surely a purported grand jury subpoena, 
_.,.-.. rl 
issued not by the court or by the grand jury, but by the United -States Attorney's office, for a date when no grand jury was in 
session, and which in effect compelled broad disclosure of 
Miller's financial records to the government, does not constitute 
sufficient 'legal process ' within the meaning of the majority 
.......... ~ --
opinion o" Petn. Appx., at 14a-15a (footnote omitted). Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), applied: " The government 
may not cavalierly circumvent Boyd's precious protection by first 
requiring a third party bank to copy all of its depositors ' 
personal che cks and then, with an improper invocation of legal 
process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection and repro-
duction of those copies. " It was an insufficient answer to point 
- 4 -
to the willing cooperation of the l:smks, The legal process 
was designed to protect the depositors as well as the banks. 
Judge Simpson, in dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en bane, stressed first that the panel had made 
radical new s~~~in~ law without discussion. It appeared that 
the panel had viewed resp as having both an ownership interest 
in the records and a cognizable privacy interest. Prior to 
the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act, a depositor had not had a 
recognized standing to challenge IRS subpoenas of bank records ______ _,_ ______ ~ 
pertaining to his banking transactions. The Act did notre-
quire a change in that law. Indeed it would be anomalous to give 
a depositor greater rights as a result of a statute requiring the 
This issue was reserved for later 
~ ~ lfA,f!fh 
~ bNL· wa in good faith for the grand jury session, there 
r~ ~~~ h' I I O d O C h C 
~ .~ J~was not lng wrong ln requlrlng pro uctlon prlor tote sesslon . 
. ,do.~ .• : v ~ 
WtM. ""~ ,_,li~,_ . '1\a· would conserve the grand jury's time and enable preparation 
"'" P•~ '"lu- ~ ~~ t~ N~·for that session. See United States v. Morton Salt, 216 F. Supp. 
1-na~ ~ '1~ 250 (D. Minn. 1962), aff ' d summarily, 382 U.S . 44 (1965). If 
._ powv or vtJD, 
~ ~~~ ~ Af there is a question about the good faith of the prosecution, then 
f.wu bt .tierctDt~here should be a remand for a hearing on that issue. Even if 
~ 1)A~ oJ,.·~ .... ~--10 ~ £ ·~b~ process were defective, the defect is not such to require 
ON>.~:~ reversal. 




a. The SG's contentions follow the points 
made by Judge Simpson's dissent to the denial of rehearing 
en bane. 
(1) The SG contends that the CA panel erred 
in assuming that resp had standing to challenge the sub-
poenas on Fourth Amendment grounds. Several courts had held 
that there was no such standing to attack IRS subpoenas. See 
petn, at 9 n. 8. The only protected Fourth Amendment interest 
belongs to the bank. The depositor has no reasonable expectation 
~
of freedom from governmental inspection of the records. Checks 
~ -~----------~-----~---~ and similar documents are knowingly exposed to the public. If 
it is desirable anyway to restrict governmental access to such 
bank records, the arguments should be addressed to Congress. 
The enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act did not change the law of 
standing in this area. The banks continue to pay for the copying 
and storing of records. Indeed, depositors have less reason to 
think that the records will be private. The Act itself requires 
the maintenance of records having a high utility "in criminal, 
tax, or regulatory investigations .•• ," 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b)(2), 
and thus it is doubtful that Congress intended to expand the 
standing of depositors to challenge governmental access to the 
records. 
(2) Even if resp had standing, there was nothing 
unlawful about the subpoenas. They were issued in accordance 
with Rules 17(a) and 17(c), FoR. Crim. Proc. The government 
.. ,. 
- 6 -
attorney should be able to review the material prior to 
the grand jury session so that the session can be conducted 
in an orderly fashion. Much time will be consumed if the 
grand jury itself has to issue the subpoena, and it has to 
be returned on a day when the grand jury is in session. 
Requiring court approval of such subpoenas would waste judicial 
resources. The subpoena can be challenged prior to compliance 
in a motion to quash or in a show-cause hearing. There may be 
some abuse, but that abuse can be handled by the courts. 
Compare United States v. Bisceglia, ___ U.S. (1975). There 
was no basis for an inference of abuse here. There was a 
specific ongoing investigation; the records were identified with 
some particularity. Indeed the grand jury can issue subpoenas 
on the suspicion that the law is being violated. 
( 3) Even if the subpoenas were defective under 
the Fourth Amendment, it does not follow that retrial was the 
remedy. Since the records could presumably be reacquired by 
validly issued trial subpeonas, they could be reintroduced by an 
independent source. The SG, however, points out that the CA did 
not indicate whether the taint it had found could be eliminated 
in this way. The question should be answered now prior to re-
trial. 
b . Resp answers that under State law the banks had 
limited interests in the checks. They were customarily returned 
to the depositor. The facts indicate that the subpoenas were 
being used for a general search of documents in the hope of 
- 7 -
finding something of use in a criminal prosecution. The 
search was too broad and hence violated the Fourth Amendment. 
See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1923). 
.. ~ 
The depositor does have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
.:t ~~in presenting personal checks. The expectation is that the 
~~+~.L~heck will be used for the limited purpose of negotiation and 
~~ ~~)lhen returned to him for his personal record. Compare Katz v . 
?ri~~ United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Here access was obtained 
~ rt~~~ithout judicial scrutiny or notice to resp. The facts show 
Wt~ M~ bM+Jt. the potential for abuse through subpoenaing records for a grand 
~~~~-u...u . b . h . h . 1 h d ~A.W..IJLU ~]Jury, ut Wlt out ever presentlng t e materla s to t e gran 
, Cuu.JhiJ jury or making a return in court. 
"---' ~ io 
~~ 4. DISCUSS.ION: The CA 5 panel opinion does not discuss 
the standing question and it cites no authorities for its con-
clusion that the subpoenas were unlawful. Its opinion smacks of 
a conclusion that the prosecution was in bad faith and was using 
the grand jury as a facade, but it makes no findings of that sort 
! I 
nor cites any made by the DC . Perhaps the best disposition of 
~ the case wouid be to hold it for Peltier, No. 73-2000, and then 
-n.•~ ~C).JJ. . ~~ 
~ f~~ate and remand for reconsideration in light of the latter. 
~Ki~~ Tnat would call at least for further discussion of the Fourth 
~~~ ~mendment violation by the CA -- if the prosecution should have 
~ .. 0 ~ O+o 
~ h ~nown that the subpoenas were unlawful -- although the fact that 
O.~Offllt. ' ':-'~'·) 
~ • ~tCN\ -----------
1/ 
-The SG does observe that " [t]he record does not reveal whether 
any of the bank records were presented to the grand jury. " Petn., 
at 6 n. 6. 
- 8 -
? 
I. d~ • > the standing question was explicitly left open here in the 
~(r$~d_ California Bankers case would make such a conclusion highly 
~~ ...... ~ re..f4::ttldoubtful. See also Morton Salt, supra, 216, F. Supp. , at 25 7. 
""JP "'"'""" o-tll r 
~:t A.J.l ~ The CA would probably be forced to remand to the DC for an 
evidentiary hearing on the good faith point. A factor militating 
) 
in favor of immediate consideration on the merits here would be 
the possibility that the CA decision has called into question 
a widespread prosecution practice. The standing issue clearly 
warrants answering, but the question remains whether it need be 
reached in this case. 
There is a response . 
5 / 27 / 75 Malysiak 
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Resp' s Motion for 
. Appointment of 
Counsel 
On June 9, the Court granted cert to CA 5 in this case to 
consider a 4th Amendment issue involving subpoenas served on resp's 
banks. The Court also granted resp's motion to proceed IFF. 
Resp moves that D. J;;.. Rampey, Jr., Esquire, of Warner Robins, -
Goergia, be appointed to represent him before this Court. He notes that 
Mr. Rampey was appointed by CA 5 under the Criminal Justice Act for 
the purpose of responding to the Government's petition .:'or cert . 
- 2 -
Mr. Rampey is a member of the Bar of this Court. 
There is no response. 
Ginty 
~~~---------- - . . . . . . . . . . ... .. . . , -- .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 .. . No. 74-1179 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Carl Schenker DATE: January 12, 1976 
No. 74-1179 United States v. Miller 
I recommend reversal. 
The parties appear to agree that the CA 5 panel 
held that the alleged defects in the subpoena violated 
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights. 1 Addressing the case 
2 
on that premise, I think that the SG is correct that petitioner 
has no Fourth Amendment rights in this context, so that the 
subpoena cannot be challenged on that ground. 
that a rather 
suggests to me that 
opinion could be read in another way, as 
~ 
2. 
The most useful analogy is to the "bugged informant" 
cases (~·~·,United States v. White, 401 U.S.~.) There 
the Court has held that when one exposes his affairs to another, 
he runs the risk that the other is a government informant who 
.. - ~..-.- "-"'_, 
will "rat" on him. He further runs the risk that the informant 
will "rat" very accurately (i.~., that the informant is bugged 
for sound). People dealing with banks run the same risks. They 
expose their affairs to the scrutiny of bank employees, thereby 
foregoing any significant privacy expectation in those affairs. 
Bank employees could testify to those transactions, if they could 
remember them. The bank can also choose to record the transactions 
to help bolster the memory of the employees. I do not view 
the ~tb Amendment privacy anal¥sis as being changed significantly 
~ ~- ....,;;;) 
by the fact that the bank is required to keep records by the Act. 
The "recruiting" of the bank into investigative purposes is no 
different than the hiring of an informant. In fact, it is less 
offensive in many respects because it is known that the bank 
plays this roll. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 
(Warren, C.J., dissenting.) 3 
3. I know from your brief concurring statement in 
Y California Bankers Assn. that you have some doubts about the propriety of broadly sweeping reporting requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act. I do not view your concerns as inconsistent ··with my analysis. 
When the recordkeeping requirements are used through legal process 
in a criminal case, much different concerns are implicated than with 
blanket reporting unrelated to a criminal case. I think your concurring 
statement reflects this distinction. 
3. 
This is all that needs to be said to dispose of 
this case as the parties view it. Thus, reversal is called for. 
Let me advance, however, some further thoughts on 
the case. I think that the CA 5 panel opinion is susceptible to 
another interpretation. The opinion could be read to say: 
(1) There are Fourth Amendment overtones to the Act's record-
keeping requirements. (2) Despite those overtones, the 
requirements are constitutional (California Bankers Ass'n.~and 
the Government may by proper process compel the production of the 
required records. (3) But, in doing so, the Government's 
exercise of process must be valid. Here it was invalid because 
of the various alleged defects in the subpoena. 
In short, this reading of the opinion is that the 
CA 5 panel found no Fourth Amendment violation but simply required 
that process be used in accord with procedural niceties. The 
trouble with this approach, however, is again the matter of 
"standing." Ordinarily defects in process should be challenged 
in a motion to quash, which allows their correction. Since the 
defects will often be correctable, a complaining witness should 
not be able to disclose and then get suppression, as CA 5 ordered 
here. The "witness" here having disclosed without objection to 
the subpoena, suppression on behalf of the customer seems 
inappropriate. The problem, however, is that the "real party in 
. wk.o ~ N> 1\.C){,.e.e, J 
interest" is the petitioner,land the bank has little reason to 
resist defective subpoenas. 
4. 
This problem, though, is not unique to this area. 
It arises also in the context of administrative summons to third 
parties with regard to, for example, an individual's tax 
liability. And the Court has had occasion to examine the third 
party issue in that context. See,~-~·' Donaldson v. United 
States, 400 U.S. lLJ_. There the Court held that under Fed. 
R. Civil Pro. 24(a)(2) an interested taxpayer could intervene 
in a suit to enforce an administrative subpoena to show that 
the subpoena power was being abused. 
I think the same guarantee should be available to 
those situated as was petitioner. Although this is a grand 
jury subpoena rather than an administrative surrmons, the enforcement 
procedures appear to be the same. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Schofield I), 486 F. 2d 85, 90 ("There is no indication that 
Congress intended the role of the court to be different in" 
administrative summons enforcement cases than in grand jury 
subpoena enforcement cases.) Thus, I think that under Fed. R. 
Civil Pro. 24(a)(2), or the inherent rule making authority of 
this Court, those situated as is petitioner should be able to 
intervene in an enforcement suit. In that suit, such an 
individual could contest the validity of the summons. 
Of course, recognizing such an intervention right 
does not get one very far if the bank voluntarily turns over the 
subpoenaed matter. But at present I can see no basis on 
which the Court could require notice of the subpoena directly to 
5. 
the bank customer and the initiation by the customer of a 
direct action to quash. Banks, however, might agree contractually 
to oppose subpoenas in order to allow their customers to 
intervene. Congress might also allow for a direct action. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-1179 
United States, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Ap-
Mitchell Miller. peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
[April -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmton of the 
Court. 
Respondent was convicted of possessing an unregis-
tered still, carrying on the business of a distiller without 
giving bond and with intent to defraud the Government 
of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon 
which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud 
the United States of tax revenues. 18 U. S. C. § 371; 
26 U. S. C. § 5179, 5205, 5601 et seq. Prior to trial 
respondent moved to suppress copies of checks and other 
bank records obtained by means of allegedly defective 
subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks at which 
he had accounts. The records had been maintained by 
the banks in compliance with the requirements of the 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U. S. C. § 1829 (d). 
The District Court overruled respondent's motion to 
suppress and the evidence was admitted. The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground 
that a depositor's Fourth Amendment rights are violated 
when bank records maintained pursuant to the Bank 
Secrecy Act are obtained by means of a defective sub-
poena. It held that any evidence so obtained must be 
suppressed, Since we find that respondent had no pro-
tectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaed 
documents, we reverse; the decision below. 
74-1179-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. MILLER 
I 
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informant's 
tip, a deputy sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped 
a van-type truck occupied by two of respondent's alleged 
coconspirators. The truck contained distillery appa-
ratus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke 
out in a Kathleen, Ga., warehouse rented to respondent. 
During the blaze firemen and sheriff department officials 
discovered a 7,500 gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons 
of nontax-paid whiskey, and related paraphernalia. 
Two weeks later agents from the Treasury Depart-
ment's Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Unit presented 
grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the clerk of the 
District Court, and completed by the United States 
Attorney's office, to the presidents of the Citizens & 
Southern Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of 
Byron, where respondent maintained accounts. The 
subpoenas required the two presidents to appear on 
January 23, 1973, and to produce 
"all records of accounts, i. e., savings, checking, 
loan or otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller 
[respondent], 3859 Mathis Street, Macon, Ga. 
and/ or Mitch Miller Associates, 100 Executive 
Terrace, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 1972, 
through the present date {January 22, 1973, in the 
case of the Bank of Byron, and January 23, 1973, 
in the case of the Citizens & Southern Bank of 
Warner Robins] ." 
The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoena.s 
had been served but ordered their employees to make the 
records available and to provide copies of any documents 
the agents desired. At the Bank of Byron, an agent was· 
shown microfilm copies of the relevant checks and pro-
vided with copies of one deposit slip and two checks. 
74-1179-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. MILLER 3 
At the Citizens & Southern Bank microfilm records also 
were shown to the agent, and he was given copies of 
the records of respondent's account during the applicable 
period. These included all checks, deposit slips, two 
financial statements and three monthly statements, The 
bank presidents were then told that it would not be 
necessary to appear in person before the grand jury. 
The grand jury met on February 12, 1973, 19 days 
after the return date on the subpoenas. Respondent and 
four others were indicted. The overt acts alleged to 
have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 
included three financial transactions-the rental by re-
spondent of the van-type truck, the purchase by respond-
ent of radio equipment, and the purchase by respondent 
of a quantity of sheet metal and metal pipe. The record 
does not indicate whether any of the bank records were 
in fact presented to the grand jury. They were used in 
the investigation and provided "one or two" investiga-
tory leads. Copies of the checks also were introduced 
at trial to establish the overt acts described above. 
In his motion to suppress, denied by the District Court, 
respondent contended that the bank documents were il-
legally seized. It was urged that the subpoenas were 
defective because they were issued by the U. S. Attorney 
rather than a court, no return was made to a court, and 
the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the grand 
jury was not in session. The Court of Appeals reversed. 
500 F. 2d 751 (1974). Citing the prohibition in Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 622 (1886), against "com-
pulsory production of a man's private papers to estab-
lish a criminal charge against him," the court held that 
the government had improperly circumvented Boyd's 
protections of respondent's Fourth Amendment right 
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "first 
requiring a third party bank to copy all of its depositors' 
74-1179-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. MILLER 
personal checks and then, with an improper invocation of 
legal process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection 
and reproduction of those copies." 500 F. 2d, at 757. The 
court acknowledged that the recordkeeping requirements 
of the Bank Secrecy Act had been held to be constitu-
tional on their face in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
416 U. S. 21 (1974), but noted that access to the records 
was to be controlled by "existing legal process." I d., at 
52. The subpoenas issued here were found not to consti-
tute adequate "legal process." The fact that the bank 
officers cooperated voluntarily was found to be irrelevant, 
for "he whose rights are threatened by the improper dis-
closure here was a bank depositor, not a bank official." 
500 F .. 2d, at 756. 
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals 
erred in three respects : (i) in finding that respondent had 
standing to challenge the validity of the subpoenas duces 
tecum through his motion to suppress; (ii) in holding 
that the subpoenas were defective; and (iii) in deter-
mining that suppression of the evidence obtained was 
the appropriate remedy if a constitutional violation did 
take place. 
We find that there was no intrusion into any area in 
which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment 
interest and that the District Court therefore correctly 
denied respondent's motion to suppress. Because we 
rev:erse the decision of the Court of Appeals on that 
ground alone, we do not reach the Government's latter 
two contentions. 
II 
In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301-302 
(1966), the Court said that "no interest legitimately pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment" is implicated by gov-
ernmental investigative activities unless there is an in-
trusion into a zone of privacy, into "the security a man 
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relies upon when he places himself or his property within 
a constitutionally protected area." The Court of Ap~ 
peals, as noted above, assumed that respondent had the 
necessary Fourth Amendment interest, pointing to the 
language in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S., at 622, 
which describes that Amendment's protection against 
the "compulsory production of a man's private papers." :1 
We think that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the 
subpoenaed documents to fall within a protected zone of 
privacy. 
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not 
respondent's "private papers." Unlike the claimant in 
Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership nor pos-
session. Instead, these are the business records of the 
banks. As we said in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
416 U. S., at 48-49, "[b]anks are ... not ... neutrals in 
transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties 
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their con-
tinued availability and acceptance." The records of re-
spondent's accounts, like "all of the records [which are 
required to be kept by the Bank Secrecy Act,] pertain to 
transactions to which the bank was itself a party." /d., 
at 52. 
Respondent argues, however, that the Bank Secrecy 
Act introduces a factor that makes the subpoena in this 
case the functional equivalent of a search and seizure of 
the depositor's "private papers." We have held, in Cali-
fornia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 54, that the 
mere maintenance of records pursuant to the require-
ments of the Act "invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right 
of any depositor." But respondent contends that the 
1 The Fourth Amendment implications of Boyd as it applies to 
subpoenas duces tecum have been undercut by more recent cases. 
Fisher v. United States, - U. S. - (1976), slip op., at 15, See 
infra, at - -· -. 
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combination of the recordkeeping requirements of the 
Act and the issuance of a subpoena 2 to obtain those 
records permits the Government to circumvent the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment by allowing it to 
obtain a depositor's private records without complying 
with the legal requirements that would be applicable had 
it proceeded against him directly.3 Therefore, we must 
address the question whether the compulsion embodied in 
the Bank Secrecy Act as exercised in this case creates 
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where 
none existed before. This question was expressly re-
served in California Bankers Assn., supra, at 53-54 & 
n. 24. 
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment 
ihterest in the records kept by the banks because they 
are merely copies of personal records that were made 
available to the banks for a limited purpose and in 
which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. He 
relies on this Court's statement in Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967), quoting Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U. S. 304 (1967), that "we have ... departed from 
the narrow view"· that "property interests control the 
right of the Government to search and· seize," and that 
a "search and seizure" become unreasonable when the 
~ Respondent appears to contend that a depositor's Fourth 
Amendment interest comes into play only when a defective sub-
poena is used to obtain records kept pursuant to the Act. We see 
no reason why the existence of a Fourth Amendment interest turns 
on whether the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do not limit 
our consideration to the situ::ttion in which there is an alleged defect 
in the subpoena served on the bank. 
8 It is not clear whether respondent refers to attempts to obtain 
private documents through a subpoena issued directly to the de-
p,ositor or through a search pursuant to a warrant. The question 
whether personal business records may be seized pursuant to a 
valid warrant is before this Court in No. 74-1646, Andreson v~ 
Maryland.. 
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Government's activities violate "the privacy upon which 
[a person] justifiably relie[s] ." But in Katz the Court 
also stressed that " [ w] hat a person knowingly exposes 
to the public . .. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection." ld., at 351. We must examine the nature 
of the particular documents sought to be protected in 
order to determine whether there is a legitimate "ex-
pectation of privacy" concerning their contents. See 
Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 335 (1973) . 
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks 
and deposit slips, rather than to the microfilm copies 
actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena, 
we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in 
their contents. The checks are not confidential com-
munications but negotiable instruments to be used in 
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, 
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain 
only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of 
privacy concerning the information kept in bank records 
was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy 
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records 
to be maintained because they "have a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations 
or proceedings." 12 U. S. C. § 1829 (a) (2). Cf. Couch v. 
United States, supra, at 335. 
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by 
that person to the government. United States v. White, 
401 U. S. 745, 751- 752 (1971). This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to government authorities, 
even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
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that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
~ 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed: 
United States v. White, supra, at 752; Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U. S., at 302; Lopez v. United States, 373. 
u. s. 427 (1963) . 
This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the 
Bank Secrecy Act that records of depositors' transactions 
be maintained by banks. In California Bankers Assn. v: 
Shultz, supra, at 52-53, we rejected the contention that 
banks, when keeping records of their depositors' trans-
actions pursuant to the Act, are acting solely as agents 
of the government. But, even if the banks could be 
said to have been acting solely as government agents iq 
transcribing the necessary information and complying 
without protest with the requirements of the subpoenas: 
there would be no intrusion upon the depositors' Fourt~ 
,Amendment rights. See Osborn v. United States, ~Sq 
U. S. 323 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 
(1966) . This may be an unattractive role for nationally 
regulated banks to play, but that is a question for the 
legislature, rather than a matter of constitutional right. 
In enacting the Bank Secrecy Act~ Congress has indi-
cated its decision that the role is proper. 
III 
, Since no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositot 
are implicated here, this case is governed by the general 
rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party 
to obtain the records of that party does not violaM 
the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution 
~~ contemplated a~ the time the subpoena is issued. 
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S., at 53 ; 
l)onaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 537 (1971) 
,\Douglas, J ., concurring). Under th~se principles, it 
WttS firmly settledl before the passage of the Bank 
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Secrecy Act, that an Internal Revenue Service summons 
directed to a third-party bank does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment rights of a depositor under investiga-
tion. See First National Bank v. United States, 267 U.S. 
576 (1925), aff'g, 295 F. 142 (SD Ala. 1924). See also 
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 53; Donald-
son v. United States, 400 U. S., at 522. 
Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of 
their depositors' accounts, although not all banks did so 
and the practice was declining in recent years. By re-
quiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank 
Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to circum-
vent established Fourth Amendment rights. It is merely 
an attempt to facilitate the use of a proper and long-
standing law enforcement technique by insuring that 
records are available when they are needed} 
We hold that the District Court correctly denied re-
spondent's motion to suppress, since he possessed no 
Fourth Amendment interest that could be vindicated by 
a challenge to the subpoenas. 
IV 
Respondent contends not only that the subpoenas 
4 Petitioner does not contend that the subpoenas infringed upon 
his First Amendment rights. There was no blanket reporting re-
quirement of the sort we addressed in Buckley v. Valeo, - U. S. 
- (1976), slip op. , at 54-69, nor any allegation of an improper 
inquiry into protected associational activities of the sort presented 
in Eastland v. Unit ed Serviceman's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975) . 
We are not confronted with a situation in which the Government, 
through "unreviewed executive discretion," has made a wide-ranging 
inquiry that unnecessarily "touches upon intimate areas of an 
individual's personal affairs." California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
supra, at 78-79 (POWELL, J ., concurring) . Here the Government 
has exercised its powers through narrowly directed subpoenas duces 
tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such process. 
Soo Part IV, infra. 
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duces tecum directed against the banks infringed his 
Fourth Amendment rights, but that a subpoena issued 
to a bank to obtain records maintained pursuant to the 
Act is subject to more stringent Fourth Amendment re-
quirements than is the ordinary subpoena. In making 
this assertion he relies on our statement in California. 
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, that access to the records 
maintained by banks under the Act was to be controlled 
by "existing legal process." 
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 
186, 208 (1946), the Court said that "the Fourth 
[Amendment], if applicable [to subpoenas for the pro-
duction of business records and papers], at the most 
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefinite-
ness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly 
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding 
agency is authorized by law to make and the materials 
specified are relevant." See also United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973). Respondent, citing 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297 ( 1973), in which we discussed the application of 
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to 
domestic security surveillance through electronic eaves-
dropping, suggests that greater judicial scrutiny, equiv-
alent to that required for a search warrant, is neces-
sary when a subpoena is to be used to obtain bank 
records of a depositor's account. But in California 
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, we emphasized only that 
access to the records was to be in accordance with ''exist-
ing legal process." There was no indication that a new 
rule was to be devised, or that the traditional distinction 
between a search warrant and a subpoena would not be 
recognized.5 
"A subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject to 
no more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the 
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fn any event, for the reasons stated above, we hold 
that respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment-
interest to challenge the validity of the subpoenas. 
v 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The. 
Court deferred decision on whether the trial court had 
improperly overruled respondent's motion to suppress, 
distillery apparatus and raw material seized from a rented 
truck. We remand for· disposition of that issue. 
So ordered, 
ordinary subpoena. A search warrant, in contrast, is issuable only 
pursuant to prior judicial approval and authorizes government offi-
cers to seize evidence without requiring enforcement through the 
courts. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, g...10 (1973). 
6 There is no occasion for us to address whether the subpoenas 
complied with the requirements outlined in Walling. The banks 
upon which they were served did not contest their validity. 
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Respondent was convicted of possessing an unregis-
tered still, carrying on the business of a distiller without 
giving bond and with intent to defraud the Government 
of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon 
which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud 
the United States of tax revenues. 18 U. S. C. § 371; 
26 U. S. C. § 5179, 5205, 5601 et seq. Prior to trial 
respondent moved to suppress copies of checks and other 
bank records obtained by means of allegedly defective 
subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks at which 
he had accounts. The records had been maintained by 
the banks in compliance with the requirements of the 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U. S. C. § 1829 (d) . 
The District Court overruled respondent's motion to 
suppress and the evidence was admitted. The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground 
that a depositor's Fourth Amendment rights are violated 
when bank records maintained pursuant to the Bank 
Secrecy Act are obtained by means of a defective sub-
poena. It held that any evidence so obtained must be 
suppressed. Since we find that respondent had no pro-
tectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaed 
documents, we reverse the decision below. 
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I 
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informant's 
tip, a deputy sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped 
a van-type truck occupied by two of respondent's alleged 
coconspirators. The truck contained distillery appa• 
ratus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke 
out in a Kathleen, Ga., warehouse rented to respondent. 
During the blaze firemen and sheriff department officials 
discovered a 7,500 gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons 
of nontax-paid whiskey, and related paraphernalia. 
Two weeks later agents from the Treasury Depart-
ment's Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Unit presented 
grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the clerk of the· 
District Court, and completed by the United States 
Attorney's office, to the presidents of the Citizens & 
Southern Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of 
Byron, where respondent maintained accounts. The· 
subpoenas required the two presidents to appear on 
January 23, 1973, and to produce 
"all records of accounts, i. e., savings, checking, 
loan or otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller· 
(respondent], 3859 Mathis Street, Macon, Ga. 
and/ or Mitch Miller Associates, 100 Executive 
Terrace, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 1972; 
through the present date [January 22, 1973, in the· 
case of the Bank of Byron, and January 23, 1973, 
in the case of the Citizens & Southern Bank of 
Warner Robins] ." 
The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoenas 
had been served but ordered their employees to make the · 
records available and to provide copies of any documents· 
the agents desired. At the Bank of Byron, an agent was· 
shown microfilm copies of the relevant checks and pro~ 
v.id~d with copies of one deposit slip and two checks.. 
14-1179-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v, MILLER 3 
At the Citizens & Southern Bank microfilm records also 
were shown to the agent, and he was given copies of 
the records of respondent's account during the applicable 
period. These included all checks, deposit slips, two 
flnanci.al statements and three monthly statements. The 
bank presidents were then told that it would not be 
necessary to appear in person before the grand jury. 
The grand jury met on February 12, 1973, 19 days 
after the return date on the subpoenas. Respondent and 
four others were indicted. The overt acts alleged to 
have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 
included three financial transactions-the rental by re-
spondent of the van-type truck, the purchase by respond-
ent of radio equipment, and the purchase by respondent 
of a quantity of sheet metal and metal pipe. The record 
does not indicate whether any of the bank records were 
in fact presented to the grand jury. They were used in 
the investigation and provided "one or two" investiga-
tory leads. Copies of the checks also were introduced 
at trial to establish the overt acts described above. 
In his motion to suppress, denied by the District Court, 
respondent contended that the bank documents were il-
legally seized. It was urged that the subpoenas were 
defective because they were issued by the U. S. Attorney 
rather than a court, no return was made to a court, and 
the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the grand 
jury was not in session. The Court of Appeals reversed. 
500 F . 2d 751 (1974). Citing the prohibition in Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 622 (1886), against "com-
pulsory production of a man's private papers to estab-
lish a criminal charge against him," the court held that 
the government had improperly circumvented Boyd's 
protections of respondent's Fourth Amendment right 
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "first 
requiring a third party bank to copy all of its depositors' 
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personal checks and then, with an improper invocation of 
legal process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection 
and reproduction of those copies." 500 F. 2d, at 757. The 
court acknowledged that the recordkeeping requirements 
of the Bank Secrecy Act had been held to be constitu-
tional on their face in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
416 U. S. 21 ( 1974), but noted that access to the records 
was to be controlled by "existing legal process." I d., at 
52. The subpoenas issued here were found not to consti-
tute adequate "legal process." The fact that the bank 
officers cooperated voluntarily was found to be irrelevant, 
for "he whose rights are threatened by the improper dis-
closure here was a bank depositor, not a bank official." 
500 F. 2d, at 756. 
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals 
erred in three respects : (i) in finding that respondent had 
standing to challenge the validity of the subpoenas duces 
tecum through his motion to suppress; (ii) in holding 
that the subpoenas were defective; and (iii) in deter-
mining that suppression of the evidence obtained was 
the appropriate remedy if a constitutional violation did 
take place. 
We find that there was no intrusion into any area in 
which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment 
interest and that the District Court therefore correctly 
demed respondent's motion to suppress. Because we 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on that 
ground alone, we do not reach the Government's latter 
two contentions, 
II 
In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301-302 
(1966), the Court said that "no interest legitimately pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment" is implicated by gov-
ernmental investigative activities unless there is an in-
trusion into a zone of privacy~ into "the security a man 
74-1179-0:PINION 
UNITED STATES v. MILLER 5 
relies upon when he places himself or his property within 
a constitutionally protected area." The Court of Ap· 
peals, as noted above, assumed that respondent had the 
necessary Fourth Amendment interest, pointing to the 
language in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S., at 622, 
which describes that Amendment's protection against 
the "compulsory production of a man's private papers." 1 
We think that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the 
subpoenaed documents to fall within a protected zone of 
privacy. 
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not 
respondent's "private papers." Unlike the claimant in 
Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership nor pos-
session. Instead, these are the business records of the 
banks. As we said in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
416 U. S., at 48-49, "[b]anks are ... not ... neutrals in 
transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties 
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their con-
tinued availability and acceptance." The records of re-
spondent's accounts, like "all of the records [which are 
required to be kept by the Bank Secrecy Act,] pertain to 
transactions to which the bank was itself a party." ld., 
at 52. 
Respondent argues, however, that the Bank Secrecy 
Act introduces a factor that makes the subpoena in this 
case the functional equivalent of a search and seizure of 
the depositor's "private papers." We have held, in Cali-
fornia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 54, that the 
mere maintenance of records pursuant to the require-
ments of the Act "invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right 
of any depositor." But respondent contends that the 
1 The Fourth Amendment implications of Boyd as it applies to 
subpoenas duces tecum have been undercut by more recent cases. 
Fisher v. United States,- U. S. - (1976), slip op., at 15, See 
injro., at - --. -, 
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combination of the recordkeeping requirements of the 
Act and the issuance of a subpoena 2 to obtain those 
records permits the Government to circumvent the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment by allowing it to 
obtain a depositor's private records without complying 
with the legal requirements that would be applicable had 
it proceeded against him directly.3 Therefore, we must 
address the question whether the compulsion embodied in 
the Bank Secrecy Act as exercised in this case creates 
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where 
none existed before. This question was expressly re-
served in California Bankers Assn., supra, at 53-54 & 
n. 24. 
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment 
interest in the records kept by the banks because they 
are merely copies of personal records that were made 
available to the banks for a limited purpose and in 
which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. He 
relies on this Court's statement in Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967), quoting Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U. S. 304 (1967), that "we have ... departed from 
the narrow view" that "property interests control the 
right of the Government to search and seize," and that 
a "search and seizure" become unreasonable when the 
1! Respondent appears to contend that a depositor's Fourth 
Amendment interest comes into play only when a defective sub-
poena is used to obtain records kept pursuant to the Act. We see 
no reason why the existence of a Fourth Amendment interest turns 
·on whether the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do not limit 
our consideration to the situ!l.tion in which there is an alleged defect 
in the subpoena served on the bank. 
3 It is not clear whether respondent refers to attempts to obtain 
private documents through a subpoena issued directly to the de-
positor or through a search pursuant to a warrant. The question 
whether personal business records may be seized pursuant to a 
valid warrant is before this Court in No . 74-1646, Andreson v. 
Maryland. 
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Government's activities violate "the privacy upon which 
[a person] justifiably relie[s] ." But in Katz the Court 
also stressed that " [ w] hat a person knowingly exposes 
to the public . .. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection." Id., at 351. We must examine the nature 
of the particular documents sought to be protected in 
order to determine whether there is a legitimate "ex-
pectation of privacy" concerning their contents. See 
Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 335 (1973). 
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks 
and deposit slips, rather than to the microfilm copies 
actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena, 
we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in 
their contents. The checks are not confidential com-
munications but negotiable instruments to be used in 
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, 
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain 
only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of 
privacy conc~rning the information kept in bank records 
was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy 
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records 
to be maintained because they "have a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations 
or proceedings." 12 U.S. C.§ 1829 (a) (2). Cf. Couch v. 
United States, supra, at 335. 
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by 
that person to the government. United States v. White, 
401 U. S. 745, 751- 752 (1971). This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to government authorities, 
even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
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that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. 
United States v. White, supra, at 752; Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U. S., at 302; Lopez v. United States, 373 
u. s. 427 (1963) . 
This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the 
Bank Secrecy Act that records of depositors' transactions 
be maintained by banks. In California Bankers Assn. v. 
Shultz, supra, at 52-53, we rejected the contention that 
banks, when keeping records of their depositors' trans-
actions pursuant to the Act, are acting solely as agents 
of the government. But, even if the banks could be 
said to have been acting solely as government agents in 
transcribing the necessary information and complying 
without protest • with the requirements of the subpoenas, 
there would be no intrusion upon the depositors' Fourth 
Amendment rights. See Osborn v. United States, 385 
U. S. 323 (1966) ; Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 
(1966) . 
III 
Since no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositor 
are implicated here, this case is governed by the general 
rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party 
to obtain the records of that party does not violate 
the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution 
is contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued. 
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S., at 53; 
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 537 (1971) 
(Douglas, J ., concurring). Under these principles, it 
was firmly settled, before the passage of the Bank 
Secrecy Act, that an Internal Revenue Service summons 
directed to a third-party bank does not violate the 
1 Nor did the banks notify respondent, a neglect without !epl 
oonsequences here, however unattractive it may be. 
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Fourth Amendment rights of a depositor under investiga-
tion. See First National Bank v. United States, 267 U.S. 
576 (1925), aff'g, 295 F. 142 (SD Ala. 1924). See also 
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 53; Donald-
son v. United States, 400 U. S., at 522. 
Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of 
their depositors' accounts, although not all banks did so 
and the practice was declining in recent years. By re-
quiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank 
Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to circum-
vent established Fourth Amendment rights. It is merely 
an attempt to facilitate the use of a proper and long-
standing law enforcement technique by insuring that 
records are available when they are needed. 5 
We hold that the District Court correctly denied re-
spondent's motion to suppress, since he possessed no 
Fourth Amendment interest that could be vindicated by 
a challenge to the subpoenas. 
IV 
Respondent contends not only that the subpoenas 
duces tecum directed against the banks infringed his 
5 PetitiOner does not contend that the subpoenas infringed upon 
his First Amendment rights . There was no blanket reporting re-
quirement of the sort we addressed in Buckley v. Valeo, - U. S. 
- (1976), slip op., at 54-69, nor any allegation of an improper 
inquiry into protected associational activities of the sort presented 
in Eastland v. United Serviceman's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975). 
We are not confronted with a situation in which the Government, 
through "unreviewed executive discretion," has made a wide-ranging 
inquiry that unnecessarily "touches upon intimate areas of an 
individual's personal affairs." California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
supra, at 78-79 (PowELL, J., concurring). Here the Government 
has exercised its powers through narrowly directed subpoenas duces 
tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such process. 
See Part IV, infra. 
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Fourth Amendment rights, but that a subpoena issued 
to a bank to obtain records maintained pursuant to the 
Act is subject to more stringent Fourth Amendment re-
quirements than is the ordinary subpoena. In making 
this assertion he relies on our statement in California 
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, that access to the records 
maintained by banks under the Act is to be controlled 
by "existing legal process." 
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 
186, 208 ( 1946), the Court said that "the Fourth 
[Amendment], if applicable [to subpoenas for the pro-
duction of business records and papers], at the most 
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefinite-
ness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly 
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding 
agency is authorized by law to make and the materials 
specified are relevant." See also United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 11-12 ( 1973). Respondent, citing 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297 (1973), in which we discussed the application of 
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to 
domestic security surveillance through electronic eaves-
dropping, suggests that greater judicial scrutiny, equiv-
alent to that required for a search warrant, is neces-
sary when a subpoena is to be used to obtain bank 
records of a depositor's account. But in California 
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, we emphasized only that 
access to the records was to be in accordance with "exist-
ing legal process." There was no indication that a new 
rule was to be devised, or that the traditional distinction 
between a search warrant and a subpoena would not be 
recognized.6 
6 A subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject to 
no more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the 
74-1179'-0P.FN:roN 
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In any event, for the reasons stated above, we hold 
that· respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment 
interest to challenge the validity of the subpoenas.7 
v 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The: 
court deferred decision on whether the trial court had 
improperly overruled respondent's motion to suppress. 
distillery apparatus and raw material seized from a rented 
truck. We remand for disposition of that issue. 
So ordered .. 
ordinary subpoena. A search warrant , in contrast, is issuable only 
pursuant to prior judicial approval and authorizes government offi-
cers to seize evidence without requiring enforcement through the 
courts. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1973) . 
'~ There is no occasion for us to address whether the subpoenas 
complied with the requirements outlined in Walling. The banks: 
upon which they were served did not contest their validity. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-1179 
United States, Petitioner,] On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Ap-
Mitchell Miller. peals for the Fifth Circuit .. 
[April -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Respondent 'Yas convicted of possessing an unregis-
tered still, carrymg on the business of a distiller without 
giving bond and with intent to defraud the Government 
of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon 
which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud 
the United States of tax revenues. 26 U. S. C. § 5179, 
5205, 5601 et seq. ; 18 U. S. C. § 371. Prior to trial 
respondent moved to suppress copies of checks and other· 
bank records obtained by means of allegedly defective 
subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks at which 
he had accounts. The records had been maintained by 
the banks in compliance with the requirements of the 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U. S. C. § 1829b (d). 
The District Court overruled respondent's motion to 
suppress and the evidence was admitted. The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground 
that a depositor's Fourth Amendment rights are violated 
when bank records maintained pursuant to the Bank 
Secrecy Act are obta1ned by means of a defective sub-
poena. It held that any evidence so obtained must be 
suppressed. Since we find that respondent had no pro-
tectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaed 
documents, we reverse the decision below. 
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I 
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informanes 
tip, a deputy sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped 
8. van-type truck occupied by two of respondent's alleged 
co-conspirators. The truck contained distillery appa-
ratus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke 
out in a Kathleen~ Ga., warehouse rented to respondent. 
During the blaze firemen and sheriff department officials 
· discovered a 7,500 gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons 
· of nontax-paid. whiskey, and related paraphernalia. 
Two weeks later agents from the Treasury Depart-
ment's Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Unit presented 
grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the clerk of the· 
District Court, and completed by the United States 
Attorney's office, to the presidents of the Citizens & 
Southern N ationa1 Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank 
of Byron, where respondent maintained accounts. The· 
subpoenas required the two presidents to appear on 
January 24, 1973, and to produce. 
"all records of accounts, i. e., savings, checking, 
loan or otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller 
'[respondent], 3859 Mathis Street, Macon, Ga. 
·and/or Mitch Miller Associates, 100 Executive 
'Terrace, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 1972, 
through the present date [January 22, 1973, in the· 
·Case of the Bank of Byron, and January 23, 1973, 
in the case of the Citizens & Southern National Bank 
of Warner Robins] . " 
'The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoenas· 
bad been served but ordered their employees to make the· 
records available and to provide copies of any documents: 
the agents desired. At the Bank of Byron, an agent was: 
shown microfilm records of the relevant account and pro-
vided with copies of one deposit slip and one or two check~-
74-117g......()PINION 
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At· the Citizens & Southern National Bank microfilm rec-
ords also were shown to the agent, .and he was given copies 
of the records of respondent's account during the appli-
cable period. These included all checks, deposit slips, two 
financial statements and three monthly statements. The 
bank presidents were then told that it would not be 
necessary to appear in person before the grand jury. 
The grand jury met on February 12, 1973, 19 day8 
after the return date on the subpoenas. Respondent and 
four others were indicted. The overt acts alleged to 
have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 
included three financial transactions-the rental by re• 
spondent of the van-type truck, the purchase by respond• 
ent of radio equipment, and the purchase by respondent 
of a quantity of sheet metal and metal pipe. The record 
does not indicate whether any of the bank records were 
in fact presented to the grand jury. They were used in 
the investigation and provided "one or two" investiga.. 
tory leads. Copies of the checks also were introduced 
at trial to establish the overt acts described above. 
In his motion to suppress, denied by the District Court, 
respondent contended that the bank documents were il-
legally seized. It was urged that the subpoenas were· 
defective because they were issued by the U. S. Attorney 
rather than a court, no return was made to a court, -and 
the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the g-rand· 
jury was not in session. The Court of Appeals reversed. 
500 F . 2d 751 (1974) . Citing the prohibition in Boyd ·V. 
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 622 (1886), against "com-
pulsory production of a man's private papers to estab-· 
lish a criminal charge against him," the court held that 
the government had improperly circumvented Boyd's· 
protections of respondent's Fourth Amendment right 
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "first· 
requiring a third party b.ank t.Q co_py ,all of its de_posito.rj' 
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personal checks and then, with an improper invocation of 
legal process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection 
and reproduction of those copies." 500 F. 2d, at 757. The 
court acknowledged that the recordkeeping requirements 
of the Bank Secrecy Act had been held to be constitu .. 
tiona! on their face in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
416 U. S. 21 (1974), but noted that access to the records 
wa.s to be controlled by "existing legal process." See id., 
at 52. The subpoenas issued here were found not to con-
stitute adequate "legal process." The fact that the bank 
officers cooperated voluntarily wa.s found to be irrelevant, 
for "he whose rights are threatened by the improper dis-
closure here wa.s a bank depositor, not a bank official." 
500 F. 2d, at 758. 
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals 
erred in three respects: (i) in finding that respondent had 1 
the Fourth Amendment interest necessary to entitle 
him to challenge the validity of the subpoena.s duces 
tecum through his motion to suppress; (ii) in holding 
that the subpoenas were defective; and (iii) in deter-
mining that suppression of the evidence obtained was 
the appropriate remedy if a constitutional violation did 
take place. 
We find that there wa.s no intrusion into any area in 
which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment 
interest and that the District Court therefore correctly 
denied respondent's motion to suppress. Because we· 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on that 
·ground alone, we do not reach the Government's latter 
·two contentions. 
II 
In Hoffa v. 'United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301-302' 
(1966), the Court said that "no interest legitimately pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment" is implicated by gov ... 
~rnmental investigative Jtctivities .up,Jess there is an in .. 
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trusion into a zone of privacy, into "the security a mart 
relies upon when he places himself or his property within 
a constitutionally protected area." The Court of Ap• 
peals, as noted above, assumed that respondent had the 
necessary Fourth Amendment interest, pointing to the 
language in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S., at 622, 
which describes that Amendment's protection against 
the "compulsory production of a man's private papers." 1 
We think that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the 
subpoenaed documents to fall within a protected zone of 
privacy. 
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not 
respondent's "private papers." Unlike the claimant in 
Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership nor pos· 
session. Instead, these are the business records of the 
banks. As we said in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultt, 
416 U. S., at 48-49, "[b]anks are ... not ... neutrals in 
transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties 
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their con· 
tinued availability and acceptance." The records of re-
spondent's accounts, like "all of the records [which are 
required to be kept pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act,] 
pertain to transactions to which the bank was itself a 
party." Id., at 52. 
Respondent argues, however, that the Bank Secrecy 
Act introduces a factor that makes the subpoena in this 
case the functional equivalent of a search and seizure of 
the depositoes "private papers." We have held, in Cali .. 
fornia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 54, that the 
mere maintenance of records pursuant to the require-
ments of the Act "invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right 
of any depositor/' But respondent contends that the 
1 The Fourth Amendment implications of Boyd as it applies to 
subpoenas duces tecum have been undercut by more recent cases. 
Fisher v. United States,- U. S.- (1976) , slip op., at 15, Boo 
.i~fra, a.t. 10, ' · · 
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combination of the recordkeeping requirements of the 
Act and the issuance of a subpoena 2 to obtain those 
records permits the Government to circumvent the re• 
quirements of the Fourth Amendment by allowing it to 
obtain a depositor's private records without complying 
with the legal requirements that would be applicable had 
it proceeded against him directly.8 Therefore, we must 
address the question whether the compulsion embodied in 
the Bank Secrecy Act as exercised in this case creates 
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where 
none existed before. This question was expressly re· 
served in California Bankers Assn., supra, at 53-54 & 
n. 24. 
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment 
interest in the records kept by the banks because they 
are merely copies of personal records that were made 
available to the banks for a limited purpose and in 
which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. He 
relies on this Court's statement in Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 341, 353 (1961), quoting Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U. S. 294, 304 ( 1967), that "we have ... departed 
from the narrow view" that " 'property interests control 
the right of the Government to search and seize,'" and 
that a "search and seizure" become unreasonable when 
2 Respondent appears to contend that a depositor's Fourth 
,Amendment interest comes into play only when a defective sub-
poena is used to obtain records kept pursuant to the Act. We see· 
no reason why the existence of a Fourth Amendment interest turns 
on whether the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do not limit 
our consideration to the situ:ttion in which there is an alleged defect 
in the subpoena served on the ·bank. 
8 It is not clear whether respondent refers to attempts to obtain 
private documents through a subpoena. issued directly to the de. 
:positor or through a search pursuant to a warrant. The question 
whether personal business records may be seized pursuant to a 
valid warrant Js before this Court in No. 74-1646, Andresen v~ 
Maryland. 
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"' 
the Government's activities violate "the privacy upon 
which [a person] JUStifiably relie[s]." But in Katz the 
Court also stressed that " [ w] hat a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection ." ld. , at 351. We must examine the 
nature of the particular documents sought to be protected 
m order to determine whether there is a legitimate "ex-
pectatwn of privacy" concerning their contents. Cf. 
Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 335 (1973) . 
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks 
and deposit slips, rather than to the microfilm copies 
actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena,. 
we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in 
their contents. The checks are not confidential com-
munications but negotiabl-e instruments to be used in 
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, 
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain 
only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of 
privacy concerning the information kept in bank records 
was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy 
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records; 
to be maintained because they "have a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations 
and proceedings.'' 12 U. S. C. § 1829b .(a)(1) . Cf. 
Couch v Untted States, supra, at 335. 
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by 
that person to the government. United States v. White, 
401 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1971). This Court has held' 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit the obtaming of information revealed to a thira 
party and conveyed by him to government authorities, 
~ve.n if t.he mfor:mat.ion ia, revealed em the assumptioll!l 
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that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. 
!d., at 752; Hoffa v United States, 385 U. S., at 302; 
Lopez v United States, 373 U. S. 427 (1963) .4 
This analysis IS not changed by the mandate of the 
Bank Secrecy Act that records of depositors' transactions 
be maintained by banks. In California Bankers Assn. v. 
Shultz, supra, at 52-53, we rejected the contention that 
banks, when keeping records of their depositors' trans.. 
actions pursuant to the Act, are acting solely as agents 
of the government. But, even if the banks could be 
said to have been actmg solely as government agents in 
t ranscribing the necessary information and complying 
without protest 5 with the requirements of the subpoenas, 
there would be no intrusion upon the depositors' Fourth 
Amendment rights. See Osborn v. United States, 385 
U. S. 323 (1966) ; Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 
(1966). 
III 
Since no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositor 
are rmphcated here, this case is governed by the general 
rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party 
to obtam the records of that party does not violate· 
the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution 
is contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued. 
California BankertJ A.ssn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S., at 53; 
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517, 537 (1971) 
(Douglas, J, concurring). Under these principles, it 
4 We do not address here the question of evidentiary privileges, \ 
such as that protrctmg communications between an attorney and 
hiS chent. Cf F1~her y United States, - U . S. - ( 1976) , slip· 
op., at -. 
• Nor d1d the banks notify respondent, a neglect without legal 
,cons!'quences hf're1 however unatt_ractive it may be, 
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was firmly settled, before the passage of the Bank 
Secrecy Act , that an Internal Revenue Service summons 
directed to a third-party bank does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment rights of a depositor under investiga-
tion. See First N ational Bank v. United States, 267 U.S. 
576 (1925), aff'g 295 F . 142 (SD Ala. 1924) . See also 
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 53; Donald-
son v. United States, 400 U. S., at 522. 
Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of 
their depositors' accounts, although not all banks did so 
and the practice was declining in recent years. By re-
quiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank 
Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to circum-
vent established Fourth Amendment rights. It is merely 
an attempt to facilitate the use of a proper and long-
standing law enforcement technique by insuring that 
records are available when they are needed.6 
We hold that the District Court correctly denied re-
spondent's motion to suppress, since he possessed no 
Fourth Amendment interest that could be vindicated by 
a challenge to the subpoenas. 
11 Petitioner d()('S not contend that the subpoenas infringed upon 
his First Amendment rights. There was no blanket reporting re. 
quirement of the sort we addressed in Buckley v. Valeo, - U. S, 
- (1976), slip op., at 54-76, nor any allegation of an improper 
inquiry into protected associational activities of the sort presented 
in Eastland v United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 
(1975) . 
We are not confronted with a situation in which the Government, 
through "unreviewed executive discretion," has made a wide-ranging 
inqmry that unnecessanly "touchfes] upon intimate areas of at?. 
individual's personal affairs." California Bankers .Assn. v. Shultz, 
supra, at 78-79 (PowELL, J., concurring) . Here the Government 
has exercised its powers through narrowly directed subpoenas duces 
tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such proc~. 
See Pnrt. IV, infra. 
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Respondent contends not only that the subpoenas 
duces tecum directed against the banks infringed his 
Fourth Amendment rights, but that a subpoena issued 
to a bank to obtain records maintained pursuant to the 
Act is subject to more stringent Fourth Amendment re-
quirements than is the ordinary subpoena. In making 
this assertion he relies on our statement in Cali/orni4 
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, that access to the records 
maintained by banks under the Act is to be controlled 
by "existing legal process." 
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 
186, 208 ( 1946), the Court said that "the Fourth 
[AmendmentL if applicable [to subpoenas for the pro-
duction of business records and papers], at the most 
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefinite .. 
ness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly 
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding 
agency is authorized by taw to make and the materials 
-specified are relevant." See also United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1973). Respondent, citing 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297 (1972), m which we discussed the applica.tion of 
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to 
domestic security surveillance through electronic eaves-
dropping, suggests that greater judicial scrutiny, equiv .. 
alent to that required for a search warrant, is neces-. 
sary when a subpoena is to be used to obtain bank 
records of a depositor's account. But in California 
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, we emphasized only that 
access to the records was to be in accordance with "exist.. 
ing legal process.H There was no indication that a new 
-rule was to be d~vised, or that the tradjtional distinctiol). 
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between a search warrant and a subpoena would not be 
recognized. 7 
In any event, for the reasons stated above, we hold 
that respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment 
interest to challenge the validity of the subpoenas.8 
v 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
court deferred decision on whether the trial court had 
improperly overruled respondent's motion to suppress 
distillery apparatus and raw material seized from a rented 
truck. We remand for disposition of thai issue. 
So ordered. 
1 A subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject t~ 
no more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the 
ordina.ry subpoena. A search warrant, in contrast, is issuable only 
pursuant to prior judicial approval and authorizes government offi-
cers to seize evidence without requiring enforcement through the 
courts. See United States v. Dionisio, supra, at 9-10. 
8 There is no occasion for us to address whether the subpoenas 
complied with the requirements outlined in Walling. The bank& 
upon which they were served did not contest their validity. 
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United States, Petitioner,] On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v, United States Court of Ap• 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the· 
Court, 
Respondent was convicted of possessing an unregis..-
tered still, carrying on the business of a distiller without 
giving bond and with intent to defraud the Government 
of whiskey tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon 
which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to defraud 
the United States of tax revenues. 26 U. S. C. § 5179, 
5205, 5601 et seq.; 18 U. S. C. § 371. Prior to trial 
respondent moved to suppress copies of checks and other 
bank records obtained by means of allegedly defective 
subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks at which 
he had accounts. The records had been maintained by 
the banks in compliance with the requirements of the 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U. S. C. § 1829b (d). 
The District Court overruled respondent's motion to 
suppress and the evidence was admitted. The Court · of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground 
that a depositor's Fourth Amendment rights are violated 
when bank records maintained pursuant to the Bank 
Secrecy Act are obtained by means of a defective sub-
·poena. It held that any evidence so obtained must be 
suppressed. Since we find that respondent had no pro-
·tectable Fourth Amendment interest in the subpoenaeq 
,documents, we reverse the decision below. 
TO FILE 
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I 
On December 18, 1972, in response to an informant;s 
tip, a deputy sheriff from Houston County, Ga., stopped 
a van-type truck occupied by two of respondent's alleged 
co-conspirators. The truck contained distillery appa ... 
ratus and raw material. On January 9, 1973, a fire broke 
out in a Kathleen, Ga., warehouse rented to respondent. 
During the blaze firemen and sheriff department officials 
discovered a 7,500 gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons 
·of nontax-paid whiskey, and related paraphernalia. 
Two weeks later agents from the Treasury Depart-
ment's Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Unit presented 
grand jury subpoenas issued in blank by the clerk of the 
District Court, and completed by the United States 
Attorney's office, to the presidents of the Citizens & 
Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank 
·Of Byron, where respondent maintained accounts. The 
subpoenas required the two presidents to appear on 
January 24, 1973, and to produce. 
"all records of accounts, i. e,, savings, checking, 
loan or otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller 
[respondent], 3859 Mathis Street, Macon, Ga. 
and/or Mitch Miller Associates, 100 Executive 
Terrace, Warner Robins, Ga., from October 1, 197·2, 
through the present date [.fanuary 22, 1978, in the 
case of the Bank of Byron, and January 23, 1973, 
in the case of the Citizens & Southern National Bank 
of Warner Robins] ."' 
The banks did not advise respondent that the subpoenas 
had been served but ordered their employees to make the 
records available and to provide copies of any documents 
the agents desired. At the Bank of Byron, an agent was 
shown microfilm records of the relevant account and pro-
y~ded with copies of one deposit slip ~nfl one 9r ~WOJ~hecks. 
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At the Citizens & Southern National Bank microfilm rec-
ords also were shown to the agent, and he was given copies 
of the records of respondent's account during the appli-
cable period. These included all checks, deposit slips, two 
financial statements and three monthly statements. The 
bank presidents were then told that it would not be 
necessary to appear in person before the grand jury. 
The grand juty met on Februaty 12, 1973, 19 days 
after the return date on the subpoenas. Respondent and 
four others wete indicted. The overt acts alieged to 
have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 
ihcluded three financial transactions-the rentai by re-
Spondent of the van-type truck, the purchase by respond-
ent of radio equipment, and the purchase by respondent 
o{ a quantity of sheet metal and metal pipe. The record 
does not indicate whether any of the bank records were 
in fact presented to the grand jury. They were used in 
the investigation and provided "one or two" investiga• 
tory leads. Copies of the checks also were introduced 
at triai to establish the overt acts described above. 
In his motion to suppress, denied by the District Court, 
respondent contended that the bank documents were il-
iegaliy seized. It was urged that the subpoenas were 
defective because they were issued by the U.S. Attorney 
rather than a court, no return was made to a court, and 
the subpoenas were returnable on a date when the grand 
jury was not in session. The Court of Appeals reversed. 
500 F . 2d 751 (1974). Citing the prohibition in Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 622 (1886), against "com-
pulsory production of a man's private papers to estab-
iish a criminal charge against him," the court held that 
the government had improperiy circumvented Boyd's 
protections of respondent's Fourth Amendment right 
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "first 
requiring a third party bank to copy all of its· de~osit~) 
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personal checks and then, with an improper invocation of 
legal process, calling upon the bank to allow inspection 
and reproduction of those copies." 500 F. 2d, at 757. The 
court acknowledged that the recordkeeping requirements 
of the Bank Secrecy Act had been held to be constitu-
tional on their face in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
416 U. S. 21 (1974), but noted that access to the records 
wa.s to be controlled by "existing legal process." See id., 
a.t 52. The subpoenas issued here were found not to con-
stitute adequate "legal process." The fact that the bank 
officers cooperated voluntarily was found to be irrelevant, 
for "he whose rights are threatened by the improper dis-
closure here was a bank depositor, not a bank official." 
500 F . 2d, at 758. 
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals 
erred in three respects : (i) in finding that respondent had 
the Fourth Amendment interest necessary to entitle 
him to challenge the validity of the subpoenas duces 
tecum through his motion to suppress; (ii) in holding 
that the subpoenas were defective; and (iii) in deter-
mining that suppression of the evidence obtained was. 
the appropriate remedy if a constitutional violation did 
take place. 
We find that there was no intrusion into any area in 
which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment 
interest and that the District Court therefore correctly 
denied respondent's motion to suppress. Because we 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on that 
ground alone, we do not reach the Government's latter 
two contentions. 
II 
In Hoff a v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 301-302: 
(1966), the Court said that "no interest legitimately pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment" is implicated by gov-· 
ernmental investigative activities unless there ia an in.-
UNITED STATES v. MILLER 
trusion into a zone of privacy, into "the security a marl 
relies upon when he places himself or his property within 
a constitutionally protected area." The Court of Ap-
peals, as noted above, assumed that respondent had the 
necessary Fourth Amendment interest, pointing to the 
language in Boyd v. Unif!ed States, 116 U. S., at 622, 
which describes that Amendmen't's protection 'against 
the "compulsory production of a man's priva~ papers." 1 
We think that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the 
subpoenaed documents to fait within a protected zone of 
privacy. 
On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not 
respondent's 11private papers." UnHke the claimant in 
Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership nor pos .. 
session. Instead, these are the business 'i'ecords of the 
banks. As we said in Ca.lifornia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
416 U. S., at 48-49, 11 [b] ariks are ... not ... neutra1s in 
transactions involving negotiable instruments, hit parties 
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their con-
tinued availability and acceptance." 'The records of re-
spondent's accotnits, ·like "a:il of the records [which are 
required to be kept pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act,] 
pertain to transactions to which the bank was itself a 
party." Id., at 52. 
Respondent argues, however, that the Bank Secrecy 
Act introduces a factor that makes the subpoena in this 
case the functional equivalent of a search and seizure of 
the depositoes "private papers." We have held, in Cali-
fornia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, supra, at 54, that the 
mere maintenance of records pursuant to the require-
ments of the Act "invade[s] no Fourth Amendment right 
of any depositor." But respondent contends that the 
1 The Fourth Amendment implications of Boyd as it applies to 
subpoenas duces tecum have been undercut by more recent cases. 
Fisher v. United States,- U.S,- (1976), slip op., a.t 15, .aw 
i &iJro:1 ~,t 10. 
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combination of the recordkeeping requirements of the 
Act and the issuance of a subpoena 2 to obtain those 
records permits the Government to circumvent the re .. 
quirements of the Fourth Amendment by allowing it to 
obtain a depositor's private records without complying 
with the legal requirements that would be applicable had 
it proceeded against him directly.8 Therefore, we must 
address the question whether the compulsion embodied in 
the Bank Secrecy Act as exercised in this case creates 
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where 
none existed before. This question was expressly re .... 
served in California Bankers Assn., supra, at 53-54 & 
n. 24. 
Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment 
interest in the records kept by the banks because they 
are merely copies of personal records that were made 
available to the banks for a limited purpose and in 
which he has a reasonable ru!pectation of privacy. He 
relies on this Court's statement in Katz v. United States, 
389 U. S. 34'1, 853 (1~61) , quoting Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U. S. 294, 304 (1967) , that "we have ... departed 
from the narrow view" that " 'property inteFests control 
the right of the Government to search and seize,'" and 
that a "search and seizure" become unreasonable when 
1 Respondent appea.rs to contend that a depositor's Fourth 
Amendment interest comes into play only when a defective sub-
poena is used to obtain records kept pursuant to the Act. We see· 
no reason why the existence of a Fourth Amendment interest turns: 
.on whether the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do not limit 
our consideration to the situ!ttion in which there is an alleged defect 
·in the subpoena served on the bank. 
8 It is not clear whether respondent refers to attempts to obtain 
private documents through a subpoena issued directly to the de-· 
positor or through a search pursuant to a warrant. The question 
whether personal business records may be seized pursuant to a 
valid warrant is before this Court in No. 74-1646, Anljresen y. 
M q.rulan¢. 
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the Government's activities violate "the privacy upon 
which [a person] justifiably relie[s].'' But in Katz the 
Court also stressed that " [ w] hat a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amend· 
ment protection." !d., at 351. We must examine the 
nature of the particular documents sought to be protected 
in order to determine whether there is a legitimate "ex-
pectation of privacy" concerning their contents. Cf. 
Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 335 (1973). 
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks 
and deposit slips, rather than to the microfiim copies 
actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena, 
we perceive no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in 
their contents. The checks are not confidential com· 
munications but ,negotiable instruments to be Used in 
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, 
including financial statements and deposit slips, contain 
only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business. The lack of any legitimate expectation of 
privacy concerning the information kept in bank records 
was assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy 
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require records 
to be maintained because they "have a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations 
and proceedings." 12 U. S. C. § 1829b (a) (1). Cf. 
Couch v. United States, supra, at 335. 
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by 
that person to the government. United States v. White, 
401 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1971). This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to government authorities, 
even if the information is revealed on the assumptio:q: 
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that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. 
ld., at 752; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S., at 302; 
Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427 (1963).4 
This analysis is not changed by the mandate of the 
Bank Secrecy Act that records of depositors' transactions 
be maintained by banks. In California Bankers Assn. V; 
Shultz, supra, at 52-53, we rejected the contention that 
banks, when keeping records of their depositors' trans-
actions pursuant to the Act, are acting solely as agents· 
of the government. But, even if the banks could be 
said to have been acting solely as government agents in 
·transcribing the necessary information and complying· 
without protest 5 with the requirements of the subpoenas, 
·there would be no intrusion upon the . depositors' ·Fourth 
Amendment rights. See Dsborn v. United States, 385 
U. S. 323 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. ~06 
I (1966), 
III 
Since no Fourth Amendment inter~sts of the depositor 
· ~e implicated here, this case is governed by the general 
rule that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party 
' to obtain the records of that party rloes not violate· 
·the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution 
is contemplate4 at the time the subpoena is issued. 
'California 8anl.cers Assn. · v. Shultz, 4:16 U. S., at 53;· 
Donaldson v. United · States, 400 U.-S. 51:-7, 537 (1971) 
(Douglas, J ., concurring). Under these principles, it 
4 We do not address here the question of evidentiary privileges, 
such a.s that protecting communications between an attorney and· 
· his client. Cf; Fisher, v. United States, - U. S. - (1976), slip 
' op., at - . 
.o; Nor did the banks notify respondent , a. neglect witho1;1t l~~at 
• ,~onse~~ences here, however unattractive_ 1t ma.Y ,9e. · 
• J 
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was firmly settled, before the passage of the Bank 
'secrecy Act, that an Internal Revenue Service summons 
directed to a third-party bank does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment rights of a depositor under investiga-
tion. See First National Bank v. United States, 267 U.S. 
576 (1925), 'aff'g 295 F. 142 (SD Ala. 1924). See 'also 
California Bqnkers Assn. v. Shultz, suy_ra, at 53; Donald-
son v. United States, 400 U. S., at 522. . 
Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of 
'their depositors' accounts, although not all bau"ks did so 
and the practice was declining in recent years. By re-
quiring that such records be kept by all banks, the Bank 
Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to circum-
vent established Fourth Amendment rights. It is_merely 
an attempt to facilitate the use . of a proper and long-
standing law enforcement technique by ipsuring that 
records are available when they are needed.6 
We hold that the District Court correctly denied re-
spondent's motion to suppress, sine~ he possessed no 
Fourth Amendment interest that could be vindicated by 
a challenge to the subpoenas. 
6 Petitioner does not contend that the subpoenas infringed upon 
his First Amendment rights. There was no blanket reporting re-
quirement of the sort we addressed in · Buckley v. Valeo, - U. S. 
- (1976) , slip op., at 54-76, nor any allegation of an improper 
inquiry into protected associational activities of the sort presented 
in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 
(1975) . 
We are not confronted with a situation in which the Government, 
through "unreviewed executive discretion," has made a wide-ranging 
inquiry that unneoossarily "touchfes] upon intimate areas of an 
individual's personal affairs." California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
supra, at 78-79 (PowELL, J ., concurring) . Hete the Government 
has exercised its powers through narrowly directed subpoenas duces 
tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such . procees. 
·see ·Part IV, infra . 
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IV 
Respondent contends not only that the subpoenaS 
duces tecum directed against the banks infringed his 
Fourth Amendment rights, but that a subpoena issued 
to a bank to obtain records maintained pursuant to the 
Act is subject to more stringent Fourth Amendment re-
quirements than is the ordinary subpoena. In making 
this assertion he relies on our statement in California 
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, that access to the records 
maintained by banks under the Act is to be controlled 
by "existing legal process." 7 
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 
186, 208 ( 19-'6), the Court said that "the Fourth 
[Amendment], if applicable [to subpoenas for the pro-
duction of b\}siness records and papers], at the most 
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefinite-
ness or breadth in tlie things required to be 'particularly 
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding 
agency is authorized by law to make and the materials 
specified are relevant." See also United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 11-12 ( 1973). Respondent, citing 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 
297 ( 1972), in which we discussed the application of 
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to 
domestic security surveillance through electronic eaves-
dropping, suggests that greater judicial scrutiny, equiv-
7 This case differs from Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 
238,529 P. 2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974), relied on by MR. Jus-
TICE BRENNAN in dissent, in that the bank records of respondent's 
accounts were furnished in response to "compulsion by legal process" 
in the form of subpoenas duces tecum. The court in Burrows found 
it "significant .. . that the bank [in that case] provided the state-. 
ments to the police in response to an informal oral request for 
information." 13 Cal. 3d, at 243, 529 P. 2d, at 593, 118 Cal. :R,Ptr~· 
.at 169~ 
. ' . 
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alent to that required for a search warrant, is neces-
sary when a. subpoena is to be used to obtain bank 
records of a depositor's account. But in California 
Bankers Assn., supra, at 52, we emphasized only that 
access to the records was to be in accordance with "exist-
ing legal process." There was no indication that a new 
rule was to be devised, or that the traditional distinction 
between a search warrant and a subpoena would not be 
recognized.8 
In any event, for the reasons stated above, we hold 
that respondent lacks the requisite Fourth Amendment 
interest to challenge the validity of the subpoenas.11 
v 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
court deferred decision on whether the trial court had 
1'mproperly overruled respondent's motion to suppress· 
distillery apparatus and raw materia1 seized from a rented 
truck. We remand for disposition ·of that issue. 
So ordered~ 
8 A subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject tOJ 
·no more· stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the· 
ordinary sublJOOna. A search warrant, in contrast, is issuable only 
· pursuant to prior judicial approval and authorizes government offi-
cers to seize evidence without requiring enforcement through the 
courts. See · United' States v. Dionisio, supra, at 9-10. 
9 There is no occasion for us to address whether the subpoenas 
complied with the requirements outlined in Walling . The banbl 
:' lllp<>n: whfuh they were served did not contest tlJ,eir validity. 
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U.S v. Miller 
Certiorari to U.S. Court of Appeals for 5th Circuit. 
(M H<WA. 
Respondent was convicted for possessing ,175 gallons 
1\, 
of whiskey upon which no taMes had ~ paid /')..C..O 
Prior to his trial, he moved to suppress copies of 
his checks, deposit slips/ and other bank record~ /deemed 
to be incriminating. These records had been obtained by 
subpoenas duces tecum/ served upon two banks in which 
respondent had accounts. The banks maintained ~ these 
records in accordance with the requirement~£ the Bank 
Secrecy Act of 1970. 
The District Court declined to suppress the records, 
but the Court of Appeals ~eversed. It concluded that the 
records had been obtained by defective subpoenas, thereby 
violating respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
We take a different view. The records subpoenaed 
were not respondent's rivate papers. Rather, they were 
busine~s records of the banks'. Even with respect to the 
~ ·----
original checks and deposit slipsJ'copied by the banks, 
respondent - having made these available to a third party,;! 
th~k - could have had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in their contents. The depositor takes the risk, 
~~~U<-1~ 
k ... ~ ..... /.:.,_, ~­
~~ 
in revealing his affairs to another;{n the course of 
his commercial transactions,j that the information will 
be conveyed to the government. 
2. 
We conclude, therefore, that there was no intrusion -upon protected Fourth Amendment interests of respondent~ 
and that the District Court correctly denied respondent's 
motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. 
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall have 
filed dissenting opinions. 
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•. Miller -
Certiorari to u.s. Court of Appeals for 5th Circuit. 
Respondeat was convicted for possessing 175 gallons 
of whiskey upon which no taxes had been paid . 
Prior to his trial, be moved to suppress copies of 
bia checks, deposit slips and other bank recorda deemed 
to be incr iminatiag. These recorda had been obtained by 
subpoenas duces tecum served upon two banks in which 
respondent had accounts. The banks maintained that these 
records in accordance with the requirements of the Bank 
Seer cy Act >of l970. 
The District Court declined to suppress the records, 
but tbe Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded that the 
records had been obtained by defective subpo nas, thereby 
violating respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
e take a different view. The records subpoenaed 
were not respondent's private papers. Rather, they were 
business records of th banks • . :t.ven with respect to the 
original checks and deposit slips copied by the banks, 
respondent - having de these available to a third party, 
the bank - could bave had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in their contents. The depositor takes the risk., 
in revealing his affairs to another in the course of 
his cOIIB.Dercial transactions, that the information will 
be conveyed to the government. 
2. 
We conclude, therefore, that there was no intrusion 
upon protected Fourth Amendment interests of respondent, 
and that the District Court correctly denied respondent's 
motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. 
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall have 
filed dissenting opinions. 
~ttpTttttt ~uurl o-f flrt '!lht±ttb ~aicg 
2las-!p:n.gton:, ~. ~· 2llc?J.t,~ 
CHAMBE RS OF April 29, 1976 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Case held for No. 74-1179 U.S. v. Miller 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 75-5425 Riddick v. United States 
The only question in this case is that addressed by the 
Court in Miller: Whether a defendant can challenge the 
admission into evidence at trial of bank records subpoenaed 
from a bank handling his financial transactions. In this 
case, unlike Miller, the subpoenas were concededly in 
compliance with Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. But, as we said in Miller (note 2): 
"We see no reason why the existence of a 
Fourth Amendment interest turns on whether 
the subpoena is defective. Therefore, we do 
not limit our consideration to the situation 
in which there is an alleged defect in the 
subpoena served on the bank." 
CAB refused to allow petitioner to challenge the introduction 








~\ :'--< J 
\ 
~-1: .
I L.\ ... ~"' ~ ~~ 
u -t ..).. 
~~t 
~ 




" "il ~ 
~1. b:l 
~ ;>"-\. ;:o 
..N. )' 
~ ~{ (' 
~ 
...et .. -.c.t ~ >! --.) ~l ~ ~ 
~ 














~ w •. ~ .. ~ 
?> 
. 
~ ':\J' p; 
~ ~ ~ 1-' 
1-' 
(1) 
t ~ t ~ t q ... • ~ ' ~t' 





~~ ?J !...._... 
G" ~ 
